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Article 5

ESSAY

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES
Frank B. Cross*
INTRODUCTION

The proper method of interpreting statutes is an enormously
important legal issue that has seen enormous theoretical discussion,
including some by Supreme Court Justices themselves. This theoretical discussion, unfortunately, has been informed by little empirical
study. The theories necessarily rely upon certain descriptive presumptions that should be tested. This Essay presents a preliminary study of
some of those presumptions to better inform the theories.
Much of the debate has centered on the role of legislative history
in statutory interpretation, typically contrasted with pure textual reliance.' The contemporary debate has been considerably informed by
other considerations, such as the proper role of pragmatic statutory
interpretation. There has been some exploration of the use of these
differing methods over time but no comprehensive analysis of their
use by the Justices of the most recent natural Court, nor of the precedential effect of different approaches.
© 2007 Frank B. Cross. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs School
of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Professor of Law, University of Texas Law
School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. Email:
crossf@mail.utexas.edu.
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See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The PolymorphicPrinciple and the JudicialRole in Stat-

utory Interpretation,84 TEX. L. REv. 339, 339 (2005) (describing the "clash" between
devotees of textualism and those who rely on legislative intent).

1972

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

After very briefly reviewing the theory underlying the interpretive
methodologies, I embark on a study of their use in recent years by the
current natural Court. Each statutory interpretation decision was
coded for various cues to different interpretive methodologies. Then
these cues were combined into an overall index for the different
approaches. Descriptive statistics reveal that textualism and legislative
intent are most common, but all the approaches find material use in
Court opinions, though their frequencies differ among the Justices.
Having identified the opinions that make greater or lesser use of
particular interpretive approaches, I then examine the use of these
opinions as precedents. Textualist opinions find much greater use as
precedents but are even more likely to receive negative treatment
from subsequent courts. Use of the canons and legislative intent
apparently reflect a relatively minimalist approach to decisionmaking,
while textualism is a more "maximalist" projection of Supreme Court
power.
I.

INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES SUMMARIZED

A great deal has been written on methods of statutory interpretation, and this Part provides an abbreviated review of the theoretical
arguments raised in the academic literature. Ultimately, statutory
interpretation involves giving meaning to a statutory text, in the context of a particular legal dispute. This Part considers the theories of
textualism, legislative intent, pragmatism, and the canons of construction. These theories are not perfectly discrete. 2 Nevertheless, their
approaches are sufficiently distinguishable to consider them contrast3
ing theories.
The most obvious interpretive method, typically considered the
beginning of the analysis, relies on the words of the text itself. Some
argue that reliance on the text should also serve as the end of the
analysis, and I shall use the shorthand "textualist" to refer to this
approach. Textualists argue that the meaning of a statute can be dis4
cerned entirely from the words used in the law under consideration.
This theory is associated with the "plain meaning" rule for interpreta2 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 34-35 (2006) (contending that textualism has evolved toward significant consideration of legislative purpose).
3 SeeJohn F. Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 91 (2006) (arguing that textualism remains distinctive by giving priority to
the semantic content of laws rather than to their surrounding purpose).
4 SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 434

(2005).
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tion. 5 To help appreciate a statute's plain meaning, textualists may
consult dictionary definitions of the words that it uses. 6 This theory
must confront linguistic indeterminacy, the inability of words to perfectly capture concepts or resolve matters unforeseen at the time the
words were drafted.
Textualists have developed tools to resolve textual uncertainty,
without relying on extrinsic evidence such as legislative history. For
example, textualism acknowledges that context influences the meaning of words. This is addressed through the "whole act" rule that dictates that textual meaning be assessed in the context of the statute as a
whole. 7 Justice Scalia has thus exhibited a "broad commitment to
understanding the statute in 'context"' as part of his statutory interpretation.8 The whole act rule offers a variety of types of interpretive
guidance: There is a presumption that words have a consistent meaning throughout a statute. A commonly used principle is the rule
against surplusage. This presumes that Congress does not insert
unnecessary and redundant language in statutes. 9 If one interpretation of certain language renders other language superfluous, the
court rejects the interpretation of that language. 10
Textualism is broadly accepted as an interpretive methodology,
the controversy is over its exclusivism. Anti-textualists do not deny the
relevance of text for interpretation but argue that the statute's words
must be supplemented by an understanding of extrinsic evidence,
which strict textualists have rejected.'
Critics argue that there are
5 For discussions of this plain meaning rule, see Frederick Schauer, The Practice
and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REv. 715
(1992); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1565 (1997).
6 Some textualists are reputedly "almost fanatical" in their reliance on dictionaries for statutory interpretation. Nicholas S. Zeppos, JudicialReview of Agency Action:
The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility and the Proper Incentives, 44 DUKE L.J.
1133, 1143 (1995).
7 Bradley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning"JusticeScalia'sJurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 401, 409 (1994).
8 Id. at 403, 410-11 (citing United States v. Faust, 484 U.S. 439 (1988),
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989), and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
U.S. 661 (1990) as cases where Justice Scalia "clearly look[ed] to a broader context
that include[d] not only other law, but specific policy considerations underlying the
statute").
9

WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

266 (2000).
10 The Supreme Court has called it a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant." Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
11 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 2, at 48 ("When it comes to interpreting statutes,
aggressive textualists purport to see legislation as words written on a piece of paper,
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many cases in which the plain meaning of the text does not offer a
clear resolution and that these difficult cases are the ones most likely
to be taken by the U.S. Supreme Court. 12 Moreover, the alternative
methods do not supplant textualism but merely supplement it.
The defenders of textualism often recognize the limitations of
the interpretive doctrine but nonetheless argue that it is the best available tool for determining the meaning of statutes and that any reliance on some alternatives will yield inferior results.' Moreover, they
have supplemented their defense by arguing the legal illegitimacy of
some alternative approaches to interpreting statutes. 14 Perhaps most
typical is the claim that textualism is necessary to restrain willful judicial decisionmaking based on personal preferences, though there are
also constitutional and other arguments made against the other inter15
pretive methodologies.
A second interpretive method seeks the legislative intent or purpose in enacting the statute, as informed by the legislative history
underlying its passage. To facilitate this process, it turns to the legislative history behind the enactment of a statute.' 6 There is an established hierarchy among the sources of legislative history, such as
committee reports, remarks in floor debates, and indirect evidence,
such as the deletion of proposed language.' 7 Such extrinsic evidence
is used as a guide to find the legislative goal and, ideally, how the
legislature would have resolved the instant judicial dispute had it considered the details of that dispute.' 8 Justice Breyer has strongly
defended consideration of legislative history in order to discern the
legislative intent. 19
This search for legislative purpose through legislative history has
produced great controversy, among academics and among judges.
Some have argued that the use of individual statements to aggregate
the intentions of the full legislature is not a plausible task. 20 Others
rather than as a collective effort by elected representatives to govern on behalf of

their constituents.").
12
CAL.

13
14
15
16
17

See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.

L. REV. 845, 862 (1992).
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 3, at 111.
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 2, at 27.
See infra notes 24-28, 35, 42-45 and accompanying text.
See Breyer, supra note 12, at 848.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCIA L. RE,. 621,

636-40 (1990).
18

Id.

19 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 12, at 847.
20 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, CongressIs a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INrT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241-45 (1992).
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question the existence of a discernible legislative purpose underlying
compromise legislation. 2 1 Justice Scalia questions the reliability of
judicial history, calling the endeavor a "wild-goose chase." 22 Justices

Scalia and Kennedy have explicitly rejected the validity of legislative
history in opinions of the Court.2 3 Even Justice Stevens has cautioned
24
that legislative history may be an unreliable guide to interpretation.
These public opinions from the Justices have surely furthered doubts
about the continued validity of legislative history at the Court.
Perhaps the most significant criticism of reliance on legislative
intent lies in its purported malleability. Critics contend that "willful,
manipulative judges" attribute "a purpose to a statute that just happens to coincide with the judges' own policy preferences. ' 25 The
available materials of legislative intent are so expansive that such a
willful judge can unearth something to support whatever position he
or she favors. Judge Easterbrook argues that even "the best judge will
find that the imagined dialogues of deceased legislators have much in
common with today's judges' conceptions of the good."2 6 This claim
is oft asserted, though, without any rigorous supporting evidence.
Others claim that reliance on legislative intent is not uniquely susceptible to ideological manipulation.2 7 The classic formulation is that of
Judge Harold Leventhal who claimed that citing legislative history was
21 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 809-11 (1983) (noting that statutes are the product
of compromise and may intentionally leave matters unresolved or fail to anticipate
matters presented to the Court).
22 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517.

23 See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
491 U.S. 440, 470-473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24

John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction,140 U. PA. L.

REv. 1373, 1381 (1992).
25 Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 251 (1992).
26 Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 92 (1984); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L.

REV. 1295, 1323 (1990) (emphasizing the textualist position "that resort to legislative
history subverts democratic values by allowing judges to pick and choose from the
diverse opinions found in much legislative history, and thereby reach result-oriented
decisions").
27 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 1509, 1531 (1998) (contending that "any judge who is determined to be willful is
unaffected by methodology" and, absent use of legislative history, can "shop dictionaries, canons of statutory construction, or statutory precedents" to support a preferred
outcome).
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like "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends." 28 There is
considerable evidence of ideological voting on the Court, 29 but the
claim about its association with use of legislative history should be
more rigorously tested. One might expect legislative intent to be associated with a higher level of Court dissensus, if it is so easily molded
and willfully used.
A third method that has received considerable contemporary
consideration is known as pragmatism. The dimensions of pragmatism are somewhat amorphous, but the thrust of the methodology is
consideration of the practical meaning of a decision. Justice Holmes
famously rejected the tenets of pragmatism, declaring, "if my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them." 30 Otherjudges question
the wisdom of this position. Judge Posner has amplified his theory
over succeeding years and defines its core as "merely a disposition to
base action on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms,
3
generalities, pieties, and slogans." '
Pragmatism may be relatively difficult to identify, as it is factbased and lacks obvious cues like citation to legislative history. Certain traditional doctrines are steeped in pragmatic considerations.
For example, the long standing "absurdity" doctrine presumes that
Congress would not have intended to adopt a statute that produced
absurd results in the particular case, so any such implication simply
"reflects imprecise drafting that Congress could and would have cor32
rected had the issue come up during the enactment process."
Thomas Merrill argues that for "most of our history, American judges
'33
have been pragmatists when it comes to interpreting statues.
Although Justice Scalia is known as a strong textualist, he has written
that "consideration of policy consequences" is a "traditional tool [ ] of
statutory construction."

34

28 As reported in Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value ofAmbiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,54 STAN. L.
REV. 627, 645 (2002).

29 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (providing evidence of ideological voting patterns).
Some of this research is summarized and reviewed in Frank B. Cross, Political Science
and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 251, 277-79 (1997).
30 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1
HOLMES-LASKi LETTERS 248, 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
31 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3 (2003).
32 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2388 (2003).
33 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 351 (1994).
34 Scalia, supra note 22, at 515.
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Pragmatism has been criticized for reasons paralleling the malleability critique of legislative history-that it allows Justices to adopt
whatever result they ideologically prefer. By its nature, pragmatism
suggests a governmental policy judgment rather than law following.
Such policy judgments are inevitably influenced by the judge's value
system. Judge Posner suggests conversely that the transparent discretion provided by interpretive pragmatism may actually constrain judicial activism, arguing that "[j]udges are less rather than more likely to
be power-mad if they know they are exercising discretion than if they
35
think they're just a transmission belt for decisions made elsewhere."
Even if judges do not ideologically abuse the reliance on pragmatic interpretation, the theory arguably inserts excess uncertainty
into the law. Cass Sunstein, generally regarded as a pragmatist, has
suggested that it might be more pragmatic to use a formalistic standard, given the limitations of the judiciary in developing coherent policy on a case-by-case basis. 36 Long ago, pragmatism was criticized as
being "in a sense anarchistic and devoid of standards or principles,"
when "law requires an appreciable degree of uniformity, stability and
certainty." 37 Such an effect might be observable in Justices' disagreement over the proper application of pragmatism and consequent dissensus on the Court.
A final method of interpretation to be noted is the reliance on
canons of construction. The canons are not strictly a different interpretive theory but rather tools used to supplement the overarching
theories of statutory interpretation. Many of the canons are interpretive presumptions with considerable pedigree, which often operate
like rules of grammar for determining the proper understanding of
text.3 8 The canons are often regarded as complements to textualism,
because they provide rules for textual interpretation that rely on no
extrinsic evidence.3 9 Textualists such asJustice Scalia have praised the
canons for their clarity and usefulness in interpretation. 40 By contrast,
35 POSNER, supra note 31, at 96.
36 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MIcH.
L. REv. 885, 921 (2003).
37 Walter B. Kennedy, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 71
(1925).
38 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
andJudicial Preferences,45 VANO. L. REv. 647, 651 (1992);John F. Manning, Continuity
and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2004).
39 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons'Revival,5 GREEN BAG 2D
283, 288, 291 (2002) (describing how the textualists have embraced the canons as
alternatives to reliance on legislative history).
40 See ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 25-27 (1997).
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some have suggested that there is a conflict between use of the canons
41
and reliance on legislative history.
Although the canons appear neutral, Karl Llewellyn's classic article suggested that they were easily manipulable byjudges with canonical thrusts countered by contrary canonical parries. 42 Llewellyn's
historic claim has been considerably criticized, though, as "greatly
overstated" 43 or "grossly overdone. ' 44 While the claim may have been
overstated, some empirical research has tended to confirm Llewellyn's
claim. The study of workplace decisions at the Supreme Court found
that the canons were disproportionately invoked by liberal Justices to
reach liberal opinions and conservative Justices to reach conservative
opinions.

45

Some canons are substantive in nature, rather than being mere
aids to linguistic interpretation of statutory text. These create pre46
sumptions that statutes are meant to be interpreted in a certain way.

A traditional canon, known as the rule of lenity, creates a presumption for criminal defendants and demands that statutes clearly prescribe the proscribed behavior. 4 7 More recently adopted substantive
canons include various presumptions favoring the federalism interests
48
of the states.
A Justice need not devote himself or herself to any single interpretive methodology, or reject any methodology, or even prioritize
the methodology in case of conflict. Rather, a pluralist Justice may
choose the method that seems best suited to the case at hand. Ajustice could, in his or her judgment, rely on statutory text in one case,
legislative history in the next, and perhaps rely on some broad prag41 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992).
42 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
43 Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 452 (1989).
44 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992).
45 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2005).
46 SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement
Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 771, 801.
47 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 852
(3d ed. 2001) (addressing the canon's declaration that if the criminal statute "does
not clearly outlaw private conduct, the private actor cannot be punished").
48 Thus, the Court has established canons against federal abrogation of a state's
sovereign immunity or preemption of traditional state functions. See, e.g., Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 45, at 13-14.
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matic aim in the following decision. Pluralism is a system that grants

great deference to judges, believing them able to best choose the rules
to govern any individual dispute. Awarding such great deference to
judges is not unique to this area of statutory interpretation but is
found throughout American law, interspersed with more rigid rules of
decision. For some, this pluralism might simply be considered a form
of "ordinary judging" of the sort that courts generally undertake in
4
making legal decisions.

9

The Court as a body has been pluralist and its relative use of particular interpretive methodologies has waxed and waned over time.
Textualism was the most traditional approach, but reference to legislative intent became paramount for some time.50 After a period, the
use of legislative history has seen greater criticism and correspondingly less use by the courts. The following Part discusses the Supreme
Court's relative use of interpretive methodologies in recent years.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES

This Part reviews the interpretive methodologies employed by the
Court in recent years. The relative usage of interpretive methodologies has been a controversial issue in the literature. Many authors
have identified changes in the Court's commitment to various theories at various times, and some empirical research has given flesh to
these claims. The seminal study by Nicholas Zeppos examined the
51
sources used in statutory interpretation by the Court since the 1890s.
He found that text was the most common resource used by the Court
but that reliance on legislative history was common (congressional
reports were used in 32% of the cases, debates in 16.9% of the cases,
and material from hearings in 12.6% of the cases). 52 He also found
that consideration of the practical consequences of interpretation

53
were consistent occurrences.

Recent years have purportedly seen a change in interpretive
methods. Around a decade ago, commentators began remarking on a
"decline of legislative history as an interpretive device in the Supreme
Court."54 The canons, by contrast, were seen as ascending in imporWIuIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 208-12 (1999).
50 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 43, at 426 (discussing popularity of legislative
purpose interpretation in the 1950s and 1960s).
49

51 See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1073 (1992).
52 Id. at 1093.
53 Id. at 1097.
54 Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a
Voice Crying in the Wilderness, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 57, 57; see alsoJane S. Schacter, The
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tance. 5 5 This was confirmed by a study in the 1980s. Thomas Merrill
found that virtually all the statutory interpretation cases decided in
the 1981 term used legislative history substantially, while this was true
of only 18% of the cases in the 1992 term, legislative history was not
even mentioned in 62% of cases. 56 William Eskridge reports statistics
showing a decline in reliance on legislative history between 1986 and
1991. 5 7 However, Judge Patricia Wald examined the 1988-1989 term
of the Court and found that a majority of the cases made some use of
legislative history. 58 A broader study of Supreme Court citations from
1980 to 1998 found "a significant decrease in the Supreme Court's
reliance on legislative history documents, attributable at least in part
to Justice Scalia's criticism of its use." 59 The most recent analysis
involved workplace cases at the Court and found that use of legislative
history had fallen by about 50% from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court, 60 though usage of the canons of construction had
Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implicationsfor the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998)
(noting that the Court's declining use of legislative materials has been taken to signal
a move toward "new textualism"). Schacter did notice that the use of legislative history, though down from its peak, had increased in the prior few years.
55 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the AppropriationsCanon, 14J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 669, 670 (2005) (declaring that the "last half-century or so has witnessed a
growth in the use of canons of statutory construction to implement substantive values
and to attempt to bring about improvements in the legislative process").
56 Merrill, supra note 33, at 355.
57 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227 fig.7.2 (1994).
58 See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277,
287-88 (1990).
59 Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court'sDecliningReliance on LegislativeHistory: The
Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARv.J. ON LEGiS. 369, 370 (1999). Koby found
that total citations to legislative history had dropped precipitously over the time
period, but he did not break them down by cases. Even at the nadir of citations in the
final year, there were more references to legislative history than there were to statutory cases. Indeed, his data suggest that the decline was not necessarily due to abandonment of the use of legislative history but could be due to more selective use of
legislative history. Thus, a case may now use only one authoritative source of legislative history while a past case might have used a variety of different sources.

60 SeeJamesJ. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?:
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
220 (2006). This may have been due to the fact that the statutes being interpreted
had become somewhat dated, so that the decline in usage might "reflect the influence
of intervening authority" rather than judicial opposition to usage of legislative history.
Id. at 225.
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increased correspondingly. 6 1 Moreover, none of this research considered the nature of negative references to interpretive methodologies-an opinion saying that use of legislative history was incorrect.
They may have even coded such episodes as positive references.
While there seems to be a widely held belief that legislative history is disdained by the Court, the evidence hasn't clearly made this
case. This research examines the use and significance of statutory
interpretive methods, including legislative history. My study involves
Supreme Court decisions involving statutory interpretation between
the years 1994 and 2002, inclusive. The time period roughly captures
the natural Court following Stephen Breyer's appointment. Cases
were initially screened, through use of West's key number system, for
cases with a headnote on "statutes." These cases were then screened
for decisions using one of the interpretive methods studied. Over 120
cases were sampled, providing over one thousand separate Justicevotes for analysis. The vote of each Justice is the basic unit of analysis
for this study. In addition to coding for factors such as whether the
Justice joined the majority opinion or a different opinion, that opinion was coded for a series of statutory interpretation variables, listed in
Appendix A.
One significant advance in the coding method is the recognition
of negative references to an interpretive methodology. When an
opinion criticized the application of a particular interpretive method
in the case, it was coded with a negative number. Previous studies
have run the risk of coding such criticism as a positive treatment of
the methodology, because of its mention. These negative references
were not infrequent, appearing in over 25% of the Justice opinions of
the database. Hence, their recognition is important.
To create broader measures for particular interpretive theories, I
created new variables that combined the Justices' use of several variables. For this purpose, I break the interpretive methodologies into
four categories: textualism, legislative intent, canons, and pragmatism.
Textualism (TEXT) is a new variable created from the combination of
textualism, use of the plain meaning rule, use of dictionaries, use of
common understanding of textual words, and use of the whole act
rule. Legislative intent (LEGINT) is created from the combination of
a direct use of legislative history, reference to legislative history, an
explicit finding of ambiguity in statutory text, reliance on congressional inaction in response to a prior decision, or reliance on congressional reenactment in interpretation. Canon (CANON) is a
61

See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 45, at 5.
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combination of reliance on any of the canons coded. 62 For each theory, each Justice is given a score that indicates his or her use of that
theory. I also created a variable for pragmatic interpretation
(PRAGMA) as a combination of reliance on the absurdity doctrine
63
and reliance on deference to the executive branch.
From these uses, I calculated scores for each case in the database.
For example, each time that a Justice joined an opinion that referenced both the plain meaning rule and the whole act rule, that would
produce a positive score of 2 for TEXT. By contrast, if ajusticejoined
an opinion that made no positive references to the textualism variables but criticized one of them, the TEXT score would be -1. By
using individual Justice scores, the measures are weighted for greater
consensus on the Court. Thus, a unanimous opinion with a 2 score
for TEXT would receive nine measures of this score, while a 6-3 opinion would receive six measures, with the remaining three coded for
the content of the concurring or dissenting opinions. The following
figures display the absolute frequency of opinions for each score for
references to legislative intent.

62 The study does not analyze all the scores of canons that might be used but only
some of the most common linguistic and substantial ones. For a list of the variables
coded in this study see infra Appendix A.
63 Coding for pragmatism in interpretation is more difficult, because the theory
is not so directly associated with the particular interpretive methodologies invoked by
courts. Some have argued that nearly all the principles of statutory interpretation are
consistent with a pragmatic approach to decisionmaking. See Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmaticsand the Maxims of Interpretation,1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179, 1194. Such a broad
claim, though, is unhelpful in differentiating the effect of pragmatism. The absurdity
doctrine, concerned as it is with consequences of interpretation, is an obvious candidate for coding pragmatism. Deference is also included because it is easily understood as a delegation of interpretive authority to those who are better suited to
promoting the effective functioning of a statute. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2087-88 (1990) (contending
that Chevron deference should be interpreted as a recognition that agency interpretations are best suited to making extratextual "judgments about how a statute is best or
most sensibly implemented").
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Contrary to the existing research, it appears that legislative intent
remains a significant source for statutory interpretation in the
Supreme Court. A majority of cases make some positive use of some
tool of legislative intent. This data indicates that the purported
"death" of legislative history is exaggerated. The frequency of use of
legislative history, though, may be less than at some prior historical
periods, as identified in prior research, so use may have declined
slightly. 64 Figure 2 replicates this process of frequency counts, using
the textualism scale.

64

See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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Textualism is used somewhat more frequently than legislative
intent, but not so much more often as might be presumed. A substantial minority of Supreme Court opinions makes no reference to principles of textualism or even makes a negative reference to one of the
tenets of textualism. 65 Specific references to textualism are scarcely
more common than references to the measures for legislative intent.
Claims of a contemporary commitment to textualist interpretation are
unsupported by this research. Figure 3 displays the frequency of references to a canon of statutory construction.

65 Brudney & Ditslear's study of workplace law decisions likewise found that
explicit references to textual meaning interpretation were absent from many cases.
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 45, at 30.
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Reference to the canons is much less common than use of textualism or legislative history, but they are used positively in over ten percent of the opinions of the period. 6 6 Interestingly, a proportionally
high number of references to the canons are negative ones. The net
positive use of canons is quite low, which dispels suggestions that they
have seen a renascence in the current Court. Figure 4 displays the
frequency of references to principles of pragmatism.

66 These numbers are much lower than found by Brudney & Ditslear's study of
workplace law cases. Id. at 34.
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Pragmatism is invoked less frequently than textualism or legislative intent, but much more than the canons. Because it is somewhat
more difficult to code for use of pragmatism, Figure 4 may understate
the Supreme Court's references to its role, both positive and negative.
Even from the figure, though, it is clear that pragmatism is an important factor in a material minority of statutory interpretation cases
heard by the Court.
The above figures presented cumulative data, and individual Justices may vary in their use of interpretive theories. As discussed above,
Justice Scalia is known for a devotion to textualism, while Justice
Breyer is publicly dedicated to the theory of legislative intent. Reputedly "Scalia is sufficiently committed to his views about legal method
that he often declines to join other [Justices'] opinions that employ
improper methods." 67 Indeed, Scalia has on occasion concurred and
simply declined to join a portion of an opinion relying on legislative
history. 68 However, he has also been called a "fallen textualist," who
fails to practice the theory "sincerely and consistently. ' 69 Both these
67
68

Merrill, supra nbte 33, at 351.
See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990-91 (2006); Chickasaw

Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 86, 91-93 (2001).
69 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDozo L. REV. 1597, 1634 (1991); see also Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 403 (con-

2007]

STATUTORY

INTERPRETIVE

METHODOLOGIES

1987

claims are based only on anecdotal examples, though, as relatively little empirical analysis has examined the extent to which the Justices
consistently adhere to particular approaches.
To assess the degree to which this is a significant effect, I provide
average scores for each of the Justices for their reliance on particular
interpretive theories. Table 1 presents the mean score, by Justice, for
7°
their reliance on particular interpretive theories. 1
TABLE

JUSTICE
Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

1.

JUSTICES' USE OF INTERPRETIVE THEORIES

LEGINT
1.21
1.18
1.03
.76
.89
.45
1.20
1.41
.57

TEXT
1.05
1.21
1.30
1.34
1.37
1.44
1.18
1.09
1.44

CANON
.02
.04
.04
.03
.03
.03
.02
.03
.02

PRAGMA
.28
.25
.13
.18
.10
.06
.22
.28
.05

These results are at least roughly consistent with expectations and
the Justices' own pronouncements of their interpretive theories. Justices Breyer and Stevens are most likely to use legislative intent, while
Justices Scalia and Thomas are the least likely to do so. 7 ' Some might
be surprised that Scalia has a positive association with legislative
intent, but this is attributable to the fact that legislative intent involves
more than simple reliance on legislative history and the fact that
Scalia joined a few opinions that used legislative history, though he

tending that "Justice Scalia's method cannot be properly characterized as 'textualism,'
if that means ... the exclusion of extratextual aids to interpretation").
70 The score is simply the Justice's mean use of that theory. For example, if a
Justice relied on legislative history in 60% of decisions but ignored legislative history
in 40%, theJustice's score would be 0.6 {1 * .6 + 0 * .4}. If ajustice relied on legislative history 50% of the time, ignored legislative history 25% of the time, and affirmatively rejected reliance on legislative history 25% of the time, the Justice's score would
be 0.25 {1 * .5 + 0 * .25 + -1 * .25}. Numbers can be greater than one, because a
Justice might refer to multiple aspects of legislative intent in an opinion.
71 These results are roughly consistent with the Brudney & Ditslear findings,
though they had Stevens and Ginsburg as the Justices who most frequently used legislative history. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 60, at 223.
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authored no opinions with such reliance in the database. 72 All the
Justices rely relatively heavily on textualism and none make much use
of the canons. Pragmatism shows some significant disparity in usage,
with Breyer and Stevens invoking the theory about five times as much
as Scalia or Thomas. Nevertheless, there is pluralism on the Court, as
every Justice had a positive association with every interpretive
methodology.
There is an obvious association of Justice ideology and interpretive methodologies. The most conservative Justices are the most
opposed to use of legislative history, while relatively liberal Justices
favor that approach. This suggests at least a possibility that the commitment to interpretive methodologies is insincere. For example, use
of legislative history may be opposed by Scalia and Thomas simply
because it would yield liberal results contrary to the preferences of
conservative Justices. A study of judges on the Seventh Circuit has
found that the use of the interpretive methodology of originalism is
very highly associated with ideological conservatism. 73 While the
directionality of this association is indeterminate, it is possible that
conservatives prefer originalism (and liberals dislike it) because the
method inherently conduces to conservative outcomes.
III.

THE INTERACTION OF INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES

Although the interpretive theories are often considered to be at
odds with one another, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the
Justices often attempt to make the strongest case for their opinions by
citing numerous bases for their result. Consequently, an opinion
might well suggest that both textualism and legislative history supported that result. Conversely, a Justice might affirmatively disapprove of legislative history and reject its use or simply disregard it and
perhaps use other sources to supplant reliance on sources of legislative intent.7 4 The latter approach is associated with Justice Scalia, who
has gone so far as to write concurrences saying nothing beyond his
disagreement with the majority's reliance on legislative history. 75 The
72 This is confirmed by Koby, supra note 59, at 392 n.100 (reporting that Scalia
joined more than three opinions per year citing to legislative history between 1980
and 1998).
73 See Jason Czarnezki & Sara Benesh, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation (April,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
74 This association is briefly discussed in Brudney & Ditslear, supranote 60, at 225
(suggesting that in the workplace cases, the Justices relied less on legislative history
but did not replace it with other interpretive supports for their conclusion).
75 Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
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relative frequency of the contrasting practices, though, has not been
76
measured.
The summary statistics reported above do not capture the degree
to which Justices relied on particular methodologies and thus do not
fully capture the potential conflict. I analyze the degree to which
greater reliance on one given theory produces lesser reliance on other
interpretive methodologies. This is performed through a regression
using my cumulative scores for interpretive methodologies. Thus, I
analyze whether a greater reliance on one approach, such as TEXT,
produces a lesser reliance on another approach, such as LEGINT.
This is the first analysis, with the LEGINT score as the dependent variable and scores for the other three interpretive methodologies as
independent variables. The coefficient and t-scores for each independent variable are reported in Table 2.
TABLE 2. EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES ON
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

TEXT
CANON
PRAGMA

LEGINT
-. 016
-. 031
.245***

t
.55
1.04
8.20

The results show that textualism and legislative intent references
are not conflicting, though neither are they especially complementary. The negatively signed relationship does not approach statistical
significance. Nor is there any statistically significant association
between relying on the canons and legislative history, as sometimes
suggested. By contrast, legislative history and pragmatism appear to
go hand in hand. There is a very strong positive association between
grounding a decision both in legislative history and in pragmatism.
The next analysis follows the same approach, except with pragmatism
as the dependent variable.

in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
76 A limited exception to this generalization is found in research by Professor
Eskridge. ESKRIDGE, supra note 57, at 227 fig.7 .2.
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EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES ON PRAGMATISM

TEXT
CANON
LEGINT

PRAGMA
020
.038
.245***

t
.675
1.26
8.20

In addition to the earlier finding that pragmatism accompanies
legislative history, the theory also appears to be perfectly consistent
with textualism and the canons of construction, though not significantly correlated. To complete the test, Table 4 reports the same
analysis, with use of canons as the dependent variable.
TABLE 4.

EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES ON CANONS

TEXT
PRAGMA
LEGINT

CANON

t

.049
.040
-. 033

1.59
1.26
1.04

In this Table, we see little conflict between canons and all the
other interpretive methods. Although canons are often viewed as
companions of textualism, there is but a mild association of their
mutual use in Supreme Court opinions. There were no statistically
significant relationships between other methods and use of the
canons. The canons appear to serve as a gap filler, perhaps as they
were initially intended.
One must be cautious in the interpretation of these results.
Supreme Court opinions justify decisions, and Justices may be
inclined to cite all plausible supporting bases for their results. Consequently, one might expect to see positive associations between interpretive methodologies, as a Justice would argue that both the text and
the legislative history support his or her resolution of the case. This
would be the traditional "kitchen sink" theory of argument. If true,
this finding would still be a theoretically significant one, as it implies
that the Justices are more committed to the outcome of the decision
than the interpretive methodology by which it is reached.
Despite this caveat, we can draw some conclusions about the
interaction of the interpretive methodologies. In general, the Justices
appear to be pluralist in their statutory interpretations, frequently sup-
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porting their decisions with multiple interpretive theories. 7 7 The conflict between reliance on textualism and on legislative history,
commonly propounded in research, does not appear in the results.
One can also conclude that pragmatism is not inconsistent with other
interpretive theories. All its associations are positive, and the association is a strong and statistically significant one with respect to reliance
on legislative history. This finding would seem to dispel the concern
that pragmatism unleashes the Justices to do whatever they wish,
unhinged from statutory text, legislative history, or traditional canons
of construction.
While the relative interpretive methodologies are often debated
as if they were conflicting, this does not appear to be the case in practice. Reliance on textualism typically accompanies use of sources of
legislative intent. Nor does pragmatism or use of canons of construction displace textualism or legislative intent. Pluralism dominates the
Court's approach to statutory interpretation. The Justices tend to
pick and choose among the available interpretive methodologies, and
use of legislative history remains fairly common at the Court.
IV.

INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES AND CONSENSUS

The above Parts covered the frequency with which the interpretive methodologies were used overall and in tandem, but these counts
covered a variety of very different opinions. In some cases, the Court
was divided, while in others it was unanimous in its result (though
perhaps with concurring opinions). The most frequent outcome in
the dataset was a unanimous opinion, in 39.7% of the cases. The second most frequent outcome, though, was a minimum winning 5-4 coalition, which occurred in 26.4% of the cases. This Part considers
whether certain interpretive methodologies can produce more consensus among the Justices. For example, one might expect less consensus from the use of legislative intent, which is controversial. By
contrast, reliance on the "ordinary meaning" of text itself supposedly
78
enables diverse ideologies to reach consensus.
Professor Vermeule laments the lack of evidence on the question
of "whether judicial disagreement increases or decreases as sources
are added beyond the statutory provisions at hand," and this Part pro77 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 272 (contending that many Justices take an "agnostic
position" in the debate among theories of statutory interpretation).
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunctionof
78 See, e.g.,
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232.
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vides some of that evidence. 79 The association of interpretive methodologies and consensus is easily tested in a regression in which the
dependent variable is the vote in the case. Vote is captured as the
percentage of Justices in the majority (e.g., a 6-3 decision would be
scored as .67). The four cumulative interpretive methodology scores
were used as independent variables. Table 5 displays the results of
this analysis.
TABLE 5. INTERPRETIVE THEORIES AND COURT CONSENSUS

TEXT
PRAGMA
LEGINT
CANON

Vote

t

.010
.095***
-. 019
.032

.321
3.014
.556
1.047

Only pragmatism showed a statistically significant effect on consensus, and its association was quite strong. This interpretive theory,
when applicable, seems to command support across the spectrum of

Justices. The associations for textualism and legislative intent do not
approach statistical or substantive significance in their effect.
The significance of the consensus association is unclear, however.
Pragmatism may correlate with larger majorities simply because it is
not a helpful methodology for resolving the sorts of close cases that
produce 5-4 decisions. Thus, it may not be the methodology that produces consensus but its usefulness in particular types of cases. In addition, the regression methodology assumed a linear relationship
between the variables and the vote in the case, which may not be accurate. For example, an examination of the legislative intent score
shows some interesting nonlinear results. Table 6 breaks down the
relative use of legislative history, using the mean score, by the size of
the Supreme Court majority.

79

ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

189 (2006).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND VOTE MARGIN

Vote
5-4
6-3
7-2
8-1
9-0

LEGINT
0.94
0.55
0.36
0.80
0.67

The legislative intent scores were highest in those cases decided
through the minimum winning coalition, and this score included references in dissenting opinions as well. The scores were also relatively
high in unanimous or near unanimous decisions and lower in those
decided by 6-3 or 7-2 margins. This creates a possible inference that
legislative history is especially useful, or necessary for a case's resolution, in close decisions.8 0 None of the other interpretive methodologies displayed this sort of quadratic association with the Court's vote
81
in the case, and the textualism scores were very close to linear.
To amplify this analysis, I considered whether use of the plain
meaning rule appeared to influence the opinions of the Justices and
produce consensus. The plain meaning rule, which lies at the heart of
textualism, would seem to provide a decision standard that should be
plain and ideologically neutral, if in fact interpretive methodologies
determine decisions. Perhaps the Justices could agree when statutory
meaning was plain. For each Justice, I examined the ideological direction of the opinion in those cases in which they invoked the plain
meaning rule in support of their outcome. I compare these rates with
decisions in a separate area of the law involving constitutional civil
liberties. 82 Table 7 reports the percentage of conservative votes byJus-

80 The increased use of legislative intent methodologies in greater Court majorities might reflect the fact that the result in these clear cases found greater support in
all interpretive methods, with the opinion providing the "kitchen sink" justification
for an outcome.
81 The research on workplace decisions found that use of canons was associated
with close decisions. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 45, at 52-53. No such clear
pattern appeared in these data.
82 This approach to testing for methodological sincerity was recently used in
Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's CriminalDocket,
104 MICH. L. REv. 67 (2005). Farnsworth did not directly test for interpretive theories
but found little differences between the ideology of Justice votes in constitutional and
statutory criminal cases, calling into question the degree to which any methodology
controls ideological predilections. Id. at 70.
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tices in constitutional civil liberties cases, 8 3 the percentage of conservative votes in cases in this database in which they relied on the
plain meaning rule and the number of cases in which they invoked
the rule.
TABLE 7. PLAIN MEANING RuLE AND IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOMES

JUSTICE
Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

Civil Liberties
39.8%
35.4%
63.4%
64.3%
78.2%
71.6%
39.2%
35.5%
74.9%

Plain Meaning
39.6%
39.8%
63.3%
76.5%
68.9%
71.4%
45.8%
27.4%
76.5%

[

Number
23
23
21
26
27
29
27
23
24

All the Justices used the plain meaning rule in a comparable
number of opinions that theyjoined. Although the votes were cast in
the same cases, it seems quite clear that plain meaning was not at all
plain, as the Justices differed considerably over the application of the
standard in these same cases. The conservatism of plain meaning
decisions roughly parallels that in constitutional civil liberties decisions. The probability of conservative votes from a Justice using the
plain meaning rule conforms pretty closely to their overall ideological
preferences, save for Justice O'Connor's degree of conservatism as
measured by their overall voting patterns in all cases. 8 4 Overall, the
plain meaning standard seems ideologically manipulable and incapable of constraining preferences to provide greater consensus.
83

The data for liberal votes in civil liberties cases comes from LEE

THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM

EPSTEIN ET AL.,

486-88 (3d ed. 2003).

84 In a statistical comparison of the rate of conservative votes in plain meaning
cases in the database as opposed to other cases, onlyjustice O'Connor showed a statistically significant difference in plain meaning cases. A separate regression found that
greater reliance on textualism did not produce decisions that differed from the Justices' general ideological preferences. See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court (ExpressO Preprint Series, Working Paper
No. 238, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/238. This finds
some confirmation in a study of constitutional decisions that found that greater reliance on originalism as an interpretive methodology did not influence ideological outcomes. SeeJeffrey A. Segal & Robert M. Howard, An Original Look at Originalism,36
LAW & Soc'v REv. 113, 133-34 (2002).
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Some tentative conclusions can be drawn about the association of
interpretive methodologies and Court consensus. The hypothesis that
textualism promotes consensus is unsupported. All of the Justices rely
on text, as seen in Table 1, but more usage of textualist principles
does not promote larger majorities. A key of textualism, the plain
meaning rule, seems quite indeterminate in Court application. Pragmatism is the theory most associated with greater consensus. This creates an inference that pragmatism is not invoked for ideological ends,
as sometimes suggested, but serves as a sincere basis for decisionmaking for the purpose of advancing nonideological conceptions of the
public good. Pragmatism tools were useful in a relatively small number of cases, however. The greater use of legislative history in close
cases evidences the pluralist approach of the Justices. They appear
more likely to use this approach in difficult decisions where other
methods may be inconclusive.
V.

PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF STATUTORY METHODOLOGIES

The effect of the interpretive methodologies should not be limited to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court's actual decision affects only the parties to the case and is of modest importance.
The opinions provide the basis of the decision, which may be reliance
on textualism, or legislative history, or some other interpretive methodology. It is these opinions that have the most practical significance,
because as precedents they govern the subsequent decisions of lower
courts,8 5 who render vastly more decisions and functionally establish
the law of the land.8 6 "Specialists in judicial politics overwhelmingly
agree that the essence of the Court's policy-making power resides in
its majority opinions," which "articulate legal principles and, in effect,
public policies that affect the behavior of both governmental and nongovernmental decision makers. '8 7 Yet this effect has been overlooked
in all the existing research on the issue.
Measuring precedential effect requires dependent variables that
capture this effect. To measure the precedential significance of decisions, I use the Westlaw service, which lists how often cases are cited by
85

See, e.g.,

THOMAS

G.

HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRiGCs II, THE POLITICS OF PRECE-

DENT ON THE SUPREME COURT 2-3 (2006) (noting that while the disposition has impli-

cations, the "legal reasoning... can have more far-reaching consequences by altering
the existing state of legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of future
disputes").
86 See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmakingin the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 1457, 1458-59 (2003) (describing how circuit court decisions are those of the
greatest importance for the law in the United States).
87 HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 85, at 3.
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other courts and distinguishes negative citations to an opinion. This
enables a raw count of the number of times that an opinion is cited
positively or negatively. Westlaw also has a depth of treatment service,
giving more "depth of treatment stars" to citing opinions that make

greater use of the precedent. Thus, a "four star" treatment of an opinion means that the citing case has a substantial discussion of the precedent, such as a full textual page of analysis.88 Table 8 reports these
descriptive statistics.
TABLE

8.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PRECEDENT VARIABLES

Standard
All Positive
Four-Star Positive
All Negative

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Deviation

0
0
0

1013
444
85

67.9
23.7
9.1

130.4
56.9
14.2

There is tremendous variation in the frequency with which cases
are cited. The number of four-star positive precedential uses is quite
high, compared with cases generally, but this may simply be due to the
fact that the Supreme Court cases are recent ones with less precedential development by lower courts, requiring closer analysis in the early
decisions applying them. Positive treatment exceeds negative treatment, but the negative treatment is material, as the average case sees
over nine negative applications by subsequent decisions, notwithstanding the recency of the precedential opinion. Because the distribution
of citations is not normal and has a heavy right tail of highly cited
cases, I converted them to a log scale to better normalize the distribution and use the log scales as the dependent variables in the following
tests of the effect of interpretive methodologies on precedential
effect.
This analysis requires the use of control variables that may influence the frequency with which Supreme Court opinions are used as
precedent. The year of the decision is a necessary control variable,
because the Court decisions in the data are relatively recent ones, and
earlier opinions have more opportunity to be cited as precedents. I
use vote as a variable measuring the size of the deciding Court majority, because there is a belief that decisions with larger majorities are
more influential as precedents. 8 9 In addition, an ideology variable
88

See A] Harrison, KeyCite Review, LAw LIBRARY RESOURCE

XCHANGE,

http://www.

westlaw.com/WestlawFeatures/Internet/llrx.wl (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
89

See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It

and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 632 (1990); Sara Benesh & Malia Red-
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captures whether the Court's decision is a liberal or conservative one,
as this fact may also influence lower court use of precedent. This was
coded as a dummy variable, with liberal decisions coded as a "1" and
conservative decisions coded as "0." Table 9 reports the results of a
regression using these control variables with the four interpretive
methodology variables of the underlying Supreme Court opinion
cited, reporting the coefficient and the t-term for statistical
significance.
TABLE 9.

INTERPRETIVE THEORIES AND TOTAL POSITIVE CITATIONS

Year
Vote
Ideology
TEXT
LEGINT

Citations
-. 183***

t
5.869

-. 186***
-. 015

5.975
.487
3.426
.512

.106***
.016

PRAGMA

.033

.312

CANON

-. 053*

1.719

The association with vote was significant and negative, perhaps

meaning that the more significant cases are the difficult close ones for
the Court. The association with year was significant and negative,
which meant that earlier cases received more citations, as expected.
Ideology was insignificant. Of our interpretive methodologies, textualism had an effect and it was a distinctly positive one. Opinions that
relied more heavily on textualism were more often used in subsequent
decisions. Reliance on the canons had less citation impact, with statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
The total positive citations included all lower court cases, including relatively insignificant applications such as string citations. I
examine "substantial" positive citations as those with "four star" coding in Westlaw. Such substantial use may be the best measure of the
precedential value of a Supreme Court opinion. Table 10 reports the
results of the same regression, using those substantial citations as the
dependent variable.

dick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 537, 546-47 (2002); Richard L. Pacelle & Lawrence
Baum, Supreme Court Authority in the Judiciary: A Study of Remands, 29 AM. POL. Q. 169,
175-76 (1992).
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INTERPRETIVE THEORIES AND SUBSTANTIAL
POSITIVE CITATIONS

I1

Citations

t

Year

-. 008

.249

Vote
Ideology

-..175***
-. 052

5.231
1.532

TEXT
LEGINT
PRAGMA

.071**
.039
.078**

2.122
1.133

CANON

-. 126***

3.770

2.263

Textualism and pragmatism are both statistically significantly
associated with more substantial positive citations. Use of the canons
again shows a significant negative association with such citations. Textualism appears to be a powerful device for influencing subsequent
opinions, while reliance on canons is a relatively weak device. This
might be interpreted as evidence that textualist opinions are more
"useful" to later courts.
The next analysis considers negative citations to Supreme Court
opinions. The Westlaw system distinguishes negative citations to a
Court opinion, which includes reversals and the more common cases
where the opinion was "not followed," or where a court distinguished
or declined to extend the application of the decision. Table 11 replicates the analysis for the categories of positive citations, with all negative citations as the dependent variable.
TABI.E 11.

INTERPRETIVE THEORIES AND TOTAL NEGATIVE CITATIONS

Citations

t

Year

-. 073**

2.255

Vote
Ideology
TEXT
LEGINT
PRAGMA
CANON

-. 233***
.07**
.146***
.027
.075**
-. 006

7.265
2.144
4.569
.823
2.258
.182

The control variables are all highly significant. The association
with vote was highly significant, suggesting that the closely decided
cases are the most controversial ones but also the weakest precedential decisions. Ideology was also significant, indicating that liberal
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Supreme Court opinions receive more negative citation treatment
than do conservative ones.
Among the interpretive methodologies, textualism is associated
with more negative treatment, at a level that is significant statistically
and substantively. A one unit change in the textualism score produces
a 14.6% increase in negative citations, indicating that a high textualism score (the scale runs to five) could produce over 50% more negative citations. This finding would seem to refute the theory that
textualist opinions are necessarily more "useful." Such opinions produce an increase in negative citations that exceeds the increase in positive ones. Use of pragmatism is likewise associated with more
negative citations, though with a strength that is only about half as
much as that for use of textualism. Greater use of legislative intent or
canons had no meaningful effect on negative citations.
These findings have a faint echo in research on congressional
responses to statutory interpretations. A study of bankruptcy decisions and statutory amendments addressed this question. 90 It considered fifty-eight bankruptcy law rulings that were overruled, compared
with a control group of decisions that were not altered by the Congress. The overruled decisions were disproportionately based on textualist reasoning in the courts.9 ' While most of the decisions in the
control group were pragmatic (37%), few of these decisions were
found in the overruled group (7%).92 By contrast, only 10% of the

decisions in the control group were exclusively textualist, but such reasoning made up 33% of the overruled group sample. 93 Thus, it is
textualist interpretations that were most often unacceptable to the legislature, while pragmatist rulings were acceptable. This is consistent
with my finding that textualist decisions were more likely to be negatively treated by subsequent courts but contrary to the negative treatment of pragmatism-based decisions.
Cases decided using textualist principles appear to have much
greater precedential use. They produce more positive citations but
are even more strongly associated with negative citations in subsequent decisions. This is a far more significant finding than that associated with the mere use of interpretive methodologies on the Supreme
Court. A textualist decision appears to be a more powerful one that
exerts greater influence on other courts.
90

Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures:A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions,

53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 900-12 (2000).

91
92
93

Id. at 908-10.
Id. at 909.
Id.
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Some caution is necessary for interpreting these results. For
example, they could be influenced by selection effects. The greater
precedential consequence of textualist opinions might simply mean
that those decisions are more frequently litigated and therefore more
likely to show up as precedents. 9 4 This would produce results similar
to those I found. This explanation would be a counterintuitive one,
though a striking finding. Textualist decisions are generally more
associated with "rules" as opposed to "standards" and thus would presumably be more certain in their application. 95 Justice Scalia himself
has propounded this justification for reliance on textualism. 96 Yet the
results of this study could suggest the opposite, that the indeterminacy
of these decisions results in greater litigation over their implications.
In a recent book, Cass Sunstein has divided the Justices into theo97
retical categories, which include fundamentalists and minimalists.
He identifies fundamentalists in terms of constitutional interpretation
as those inclined to originalism, who insist on setting clear rules, and
who "have radical inclinations" to "make large scale changes in constitutional law." 98 He contrasts them with minimalists who "favor narrow
rulings .

.

. that resolve the problem at hand without also resolving a

series of other problems that might have relevant differences." 99
Under this framework, it appears that textualism is a "maximalist"
approach to statutory interpretation. It produces broad decisions that
are frequently cited as precedents, both positively and negatively.
Those who Sunstein labels fundamentalists, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, are also the most textualist interpreters, which is consistent
with the thesis.

94 See Andrew F. Hanssen, The Effect of JudicialInstitutions on Uncertainty and the
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of StateJudges,28J. LEGAL STUD. 205,
205 (1999) (noting that "[m]odels of the litigation process suggest that litigation rates
will be higher where uncertainty over court decisions is greater").
95 See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 28, at 643 (noting that it is reliance on
legislative history that is criticized for increasing the "potential for confusion" in the
law); Siegel, supra note 1, at 339 (noting that "textualists tend to prefer mechanical,
rules-.based methods of interpretation that, at least ostensibly, minimize the role of
judicial choice in the interpretive process").
96 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending
that the use of legislative history "was more likely to confuse than to clarify" and criticizing the methodology for its "indeterminacy").
97 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 23-25 (2005).
98 Id. at 26.
99 Id. at 29.
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CONCLUSION

From these results, we can draw several conclusions that are contrary to the conventional wisdom about theories of statutory interpretation. All theories find material use on the Supreme Court, with
textualism and legislative intent being far and away the most frequently used. Although individual Justices clearly vary in their use of
interpretive theories, the Court as a whole is quite pluralist in its methods of statutory interpretation. 'It is impossible to determine, though,
whether this pluralism is sincere (using the best available methods for
each case) or strategic (using the methods that conform to the Justice's ideologically preferred outcome).
The purported conflict between textualism and legislative history
or pragmatism does not much exist. There is no negative association
between their usage in Supreme Court opinions. Nor do the results
support the hypothesized strong affinity between textualism and reliance on the canons, which appear to complement all the other interpretive theories. The sole strong association is between use of
legislative intent and pragmatic interpretive methods. This finding
generally confirms the pluralism of the Court's interpretive method.
Nor do the interpretive methodologies in general appear to show
much effect on Court consensus. Only pragmatism had any effect on
this standard. Indeed, the plain meaning rule results clearly establish
that plain meaning is not at all plain, at least to Supreme Court Justices. They are readily able to find whatever plain meaning suits their
ideological proclivities.
The different theories do show strikingly different precedential
effects. Textualism decisions are controversial ones, with more future
citations and especially negative citations. Pragmatism also shows this
effect, while reliance on the canons tends to produce fewer future
decisions, both positive and negative, showing minimalism in effect.
Legislative intent is neutral on this score, with greater reliance on its
materials such as legislative history showing no effect on future judicial use of the opinion, positive or negative.
This research cannot determine which methodology is the "best,"
though it can considerably inform that debate. If one trusts the
sincerity of the Justices, the availability of multiple interpretive methods is best, because it allows them to choose the most suitable
approach for the case at hand. If one prefers to constrain such pluralistic choice, neither of the common tools of textualism or legislative
intent appear effective at promoting consensus in their application,
though pragmatism does have this effect.
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If one prefers minimalist decisionmaking, one would favor use of
the canons (though they are helpful in only a small number of cases)
and reliance on legislative history. Textualism and pragmatism
appear to be decisionmaking tools of greater controversy in subsequent application.
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A

VARIABLES AND CODING

The data in this study involved coding Supreme Court decisions
between 1994 and 2002. The vote of each individual Justice was separately coded for variables including method of statutory interpretation, type of case, and ideological direction of the vote.
The statutory interpretation variables that were coded included:
Text Use: Was the text of the statute used in the opinion?
Textualism: Did the opinion make explicit reference to textualism?
Plain Meaning: Did the opinion expressly invoke the plain meaning
rule?
Ambiguity: Did the opinion find the statutory language
ambiguous?

to be

Dictionary: Was a dictionary used to ascertain the meaning of statutory text?
Common Understanding: Did the opinion use common understanding of meaning?
Technical Understanding: Did the opinion use technical understanding of meaning?
Whole Act: Did the opinion invoke the whole act rule?
Absurdity: Did the opinion find an interpretation of text to be absurd?
Legislative History: Did the opinion use legislative history for statutory
meaning?
Conference Committee: Was the legislative history from a conference
committee?
Other Committee: Was the legislative history from an nonconference
committee?
Spongor: Was the legislative history a sponsor statement?

Other: Was the legislative history some other aspect of the record
(e.g., hearing)?
President: Did the opinion use a presidential statement for statutory
meaning?
Post Enactment: Did the opinion use post-enactment legislative
history?
Congressional Inaction: Did the opinion use congressional inaction
for interpretation?
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Reenactment: Did the opinion rely on a statute's reenactment for
interpretation?
Legislative Purpose: Did the opinion use legislative purpose for
interpretation?
Chevron Deference: Did the opinion use Chevron deference?
Expressio: Did the opinion use the inclusio unius canon?
Ejusdam: Did the opinion use the ejusdam generis canon?
Noscitur: Did the opinion use the noscitur a sociis canon?
Common Law: Did the opinion use the canon requiring that statutes
in derogation of the common law be strictly construed?
Federalism: Did the opinion use the canon against preemption of
traditional state functions?
Constitutional avoidance: Did the opinion use the constitutional
avoidance canon?
Lenity: Did the opinion use the rule of lenity canon?
For each of these variables, a Justice vote was coded as "1" if it
affirmatively used the interpretive principle, "0" if it made no mention
of the principle, and "-1" if it rejected the use of the principle in interpretation. Rejection could take the form of either the rejection of the
validity of the interpretive standard as a general matter or the rejection of its value in the particular case.
The cases were also coded by year of decision, number of Justices
in the majority, whether the case outcome was liberal or conservative,
whether the Justice in question dissented or concurred and whether
the Justice authored the opinion containing the statutory interpretation analysis.

